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THE WANT OF CONSIDERATION AS A DEFENSE
TO NEGOTIABLE PAPER.
The learned editor of a valuable collection of cases on bills
and notes declares: " Prior to the case of Ra n v. Hughes, 7
T. R. 350, note a, no authority can be found for the view that
absence of consideration is a defense to an action upon a bill
or note."' And again, "It is frequently stated in the books
that, as between the immediate parties to a bill or note, a con-
sideration is necessary to the validity of the obligation. This
notion, it is submitted, is erroneous upon principle and also
upon the authorities; for although it must be conceded that
the courts have sanctioned the defense of absence of consid-
eration in certain cases, these decisions should be regarded as
anomalous exceptions to the rule that a bill, being in the nature
of a specialty, is obligatory without a consideration, rather than
as illustrations of the opposite doctrine, that a bill, being a
simple contract, requires a consideration to support it." "
The same view is entertained by the brilliant editor of a
'Ames's Cases on Bills and Notes, Vol. 2, p. 641, note.
2 Ibid. Index and Summary, p. 876, . i4.
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more recent collection of cases on negotiable instruments.
His statement is as follows: " The doctrine that a bill or note
requires any consideration is of comparatively recent origin.
It was unknown in the time of Blackstone (2 Comm. 446), and
early American cases are to be found in which it appears to be
denied or doubted (Bowers v. Hurd, io Mass. 427; Livingston
v. Hastie, 2 Cai. (N. Y.) 246). But the modern cases now
uniformly hold that a bill or note executed and delivered as a
gift is unenforceable for want of consideration." I
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
expressed the opinion that the necessity of a consideration for
negotiable paper has been settled, in English law, for centuries.'
Let us examine the authorities upon this disputed point.
In support of the first proposition, quoted above, the dis-
tinguished editor cites extracts from Blackstone and from four
judicial utterances. One of the latter is from a Scotch decision,
and another from the reporter's note of a loose comment by
Baron Parke, made during the argument of a case. Neither
of these is of value on the question now before us. A third is
an extract from the opinion of Parker, J., in Bowers v. Hurd,
io Mass. 427 (1813), which is as follows: "Now, we do not
admit that, when one voluntarily makes a written promise to
another to pay a sum of money, the promise can be avoided
by proving that there was no legal and valuable consideration
subsisting at the time; any more than if he actually paid over
the amount of such note, he can recover it back again because
he repents of his generosity." Fifteen years later the same
judge said: "A negotiable promissory note given for a debt is
with us evidence of payment of the debt, but where there was
no previous debt or demand, the note given is nudum pactum.
In coming to this conclusion we undoubtedly overrule some of
the expressions in the opinion, as reported in the case of Bowers
v. Hurd, though the case itself was rightly decided upon other
principles. . . . But further opportunity to examine the cases
has convinced us that the opinion so expressed is untenable;
there being cases in the English and other books, which are
1 Huffcut's Negotiable Instruments, p. 327, note I.
2 In re Kern's Estate, M71 Pa. 55; 33 At. 129 (1895).
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cases clearly of defense founded upon no consideration, rather
than a failure of one once existing." I
Surely a judicial utterance, which has been retracted by its
author because of his admitted ignorance of decisions when it
was made, does not raise a very violent presumption that it
ever contained an accurate statement of the law.
The fourth judicial deliverance is from Livingston, J., in
Livingston v. Hastie, 2 Cai., 246, at p. 247 (1804). Its
most significant statement is the following: "No case can be
found where the want of consideration alone has been ad-
mitted as a good defense." The entire extract is a mere
dictum, for the learned judge adds, at p. 248, "But it is not
necessary at present to decide how far a total want of con-
sideration will form a defense, because here there was a
valuable one, and there is no pretence on that ground to
avoid the note."
It did become necessary, however, for the same court to
decide this question in Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. 26 (18 io).
The trial judge "told the jury that a voluntary note, though
without consideration, was valid in law; that it was a vested
gift, and that the defendant was under a legal obligation to
pay it; and the jury, under the direction of the judge, found
a verdict for the plaintiff." A motion having been made to
set aside the verdict, and for a new trial, the Supreme Court,
consisting of Kent, Ch. J., Thompson, Spencer, Van Ness and
Yates, JJ., delivered the following opinion: "_Per cuian.
The validity of the note cannot be supported upon the ground
taken at the trial, of its being a gift; for a gift is not consum-
mate and perfect until a delivery of the thing promised; and
until then the party may revoke his promise. A parol
promise to pay money, as a gift, is no more a ground of action,
than a promise to deliver a chattel as a gift. Tt is the delivery
'Hill v. Buckminster, 5 Pick. 391 (1828). In Whittemore v. Waters
(i8o4), cited and approved in Gates v. Winslow, i Mass. 65, the payee of
a note was defeated on the ground that "when a promise is made without
consideration, the law will not enforce a performance." The same doc-
trine is announced in Thacher v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 300, 302 (18o9) ;
Baker v. Prentiss, 6 Mass. 430, 434 (r8io); and in Boutell v. Codwin, 9
Mass. 254 (1812).
THE WANT OF CONSIDERATION AS A
which makes the gift valid. Donatio perficitur possessione
accipientis: Noble v. Smith, 2 Johns. 52. The question then
was upon the delivery and consideration of the note; for if
there was no consideration for the note, it was a nude Pact,
and void as between the original parties to it. This is the
true point in issue, and without giving any opinion upon it to
the prejudice of a future inquiry, a new trial is awarded, with
costs to abide the event of the suit." I
Counsel on behalf of the. plaintiff cited as the leading
authority, in support of his contention, "that the maker of a
promissory note was not allowed to aver a want of considera-
tion:" 2 Bl. Comm. 445-the passage which has been referred
to as cited by the learned editor of the cases on bills and notes.
It is as follows: "And as this rule was principally established
to avoid the inconvenience that would arise from setting up
mere verbal promises, for which no good reason could be
assigned, it therefore does not hold in some cases, where such
promise is authentically proved by written documents. For,
if a man enters into a voluntary bond or gives a promissory
note, he shall not be allowed to aver a want of a consideration
in order to evade the payment; for every bond from the
solemnity of the instrument, and every note from the subscrip-
tion of the drawer, carries with it an internal evidence of a
good consideration. Courts of justice will, therefore, support
them both as against the contractor himself; but not to the
prejudice of creditors or strangers to the contract." This
sweeping proposition of the commentator is based solely on
Meredith v. Chute, Ld. Raymond, 759, 760 (1702), a decision
which furnishes no warrant for the statement.
In that case, the defendant was sued upon his promise to
pay the plaintiff one hundred guineas in consideration of the
plaintiff's surrendering to the defendant a note for like
amount made by one Hurst to the plaintiff's order. After
I The note in this case was not intended as a gift. Its maker, the
defendant, intended to bind himself by it to pay $530 to plaintiff in
settlement of a claim made by plaintiff against him. "The true point in
issue" was whether there was any consideration for this written, nego-
tiable promise of defendant.
DEFENSE TO NEGOTIABLE PAPER.
verdict for the plaintiff, it was "moved in arrest of judgment
that the consideration of this promise was not good, since it
did not appear that Hurst gave this note to plaintiff upon any
good consideration, and consequently the said note would be
void, and then the delivery of the said note by the plaintiff to
the defendant would be no prejudice to the plaintiff nor
advantage to defendant. But it was Tesolved (per totam
curiam) that this was a good consideration; for though no
consideration was expressed in Hurst's note, yet the note being
subscribed by Hurst was good evidence of a debt due from
Hurst to plaintiff; and, therefore, the delivery of the evidence
of his debt to the defendant, at his request, was a good con-
sideration of the assumpsit of the defendant upon which this
action is brought. Note. Holt, Ch. J., said he was of opinion,
on the trial, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove
upon what consideration Hurst's note was given, the defendant
having admitted it to have been upon good consideration by
his promise." The case does not contain an intimation that,
in an action by the plaintiff against Hurst on his note, the
latter would not have been allowed to show a want of
consideration. Indeed no court, of which Lord Holt was a
member, would have permitted a recovery on the note, at that
time, without proof by the plaintiff of the consideration for
which it was given. Such a note was, in his opinion, "but
evidence of a parol contract."' Mereditli v. Chute falls as far
short of establishing the doctrine that the maker of a note
shall not be allowed to aver a want of consideration, as does
flaigit v. Brook, io Ad. & E. 309 (839), of supporting the
proposition that a guarantor cannot set up the statute of frauds
a-- a defense.
Blackstone's "inaccuracy," in the passage quoted above,
was pointed out as early as 1794 b3 Mr. Fonblanque.' Even
earlier than this, writers on bills and notes had declared that
absence of consideration was a defense in actions on such
instruments as between immediate parties and those in privity
with them.
I Buller v. Crips, 6 Mod. 29 (1704).
2 Fonblanque's Eq., Vol. x, 342, note.
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Kyd on Bills (1790), P. 274, says: "The want of considera-
tion, it is evident, will be a sufficient defense to an action by one
party against another from whom he has immediately received
the instrument; for, according to general principles of law, no
contract can be supported without a consideration and, accord-
ingly, it frequently occurs that the defendant rests his case on
the circumstance of the bill or note having been given merely
for accommodation. But when the plaintiff has in fact given
a consideration to the person from whom he immediately
received the instrument, any preceding party being sued on it
cannot protect himself by saying that he himself had no value
of the party to whom he gave it; for by making himself a
party to the instrument he contributed to its currency, and
that circumstance was, perhaps, one reason that prevailed on
the plaintiff to part with his money."
Similar statements are found in Bayley on Bills (1789), at
pp. 121 and 123 : "The only species of defense to an action
in respect of a bill or note necessary to be mentioned is that
which is founded upon the want of a consideration for giving
or transferring it, or an illegal consideration on which it is
given or transferred." " No person can insist upon a want of
consideration who has himself received one, nor can it ever
be insisted on if the plaintiff or any intermediate party between
him or defendant took the bill or note bonafide and upon a
good consideration."
The same doctrine is laid down by Ashhurst, J., in Lick-
barrow v. Mason, 2 D. & E. 63, 71 (1787). In his discussion
of the nature of a bill of lading, he says, "So it is like a bill
of exchange; in which case, as between the drawer and the
payee, the consideration may be gone into, yet it cannot
between the drawer and indorser; and the reason is, because
it would be enabling either of the original parties to assist in
a fraud. The rule is founded purely on principles of law, and
not on the custom of merchants. The custom of merchants
only establishes that such an instrument may be indorsed;
but the effect of that indorsement is a question of law, which
is that, as between the original parties, the consideration may
be inquired into; though when third persons are concerned
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it cannot." It is true this is but a dictum, but its accuracy
does not appear to have been questioned by judge or counsel
in that much litigated case.
Moreover, it is in accord with the rule laid down in Buller's
Nisi Prius, in these words: "And it seems a reasonable dis-
tinction which has been taken betveen an action between the
parties themselves, in which case evidtnce - mn" bc- g un to
impeach the promise, and an action by or against a third
person, viz., an indorser or an acceptor."'
Although the authorities, save the last, cited thus far in
opposition to Blackstone's statement are subsequent to the
decision in Rann v. Hughes,2 not one of them intimates that
the defense of a want of consideration is a modern innovation;
while some of them cite cases as far back as 1726 in support'
of this defense. Nor is Rann v. Hughes referred to as
establishing any new doctrine.
Let us now push our investigations back of Rann v. Hughes,
and back even of Blackstone's Commentaries.
In Simmonds v. Parminter and Barrw,3 the drawer of a
bill sued the acceptor, who had failed to pay it at maturity,
for the face of the bill, and £36, 15 s. paid by the plaintiff to
the holder for interest, exchange, re-exchange, costs of protest
and damages. The sixth count of plaintiff's declaration
recited the drawing, the negotiation, the acceptance, the non-
payment and the protest of the bill, the payment of the face of
the bill, and of £36, 15 s. interest, etc., to the holder, and
concluded: " By reason of the premises, and by force of the
usage and custom of merchants, the defendants became liable
to pay the plaintiff the contents of the said bill and the said
sum of £36, 15 s., and being so liable, promised payment
when so requested." Defendant's counsel argued that the
acceptor of a bill is not liable to the drawer, but only to the
payee, and that there was no such custom of merchants as
I Buller's Nisi Prius, 274 (ist Ed. was published in 1772), citing the
unreported case of Snelling v. Briggs (1741).
2 While this case was decided in 1778, the first report of the opinion
was published in 1798.
3 1 Wils. i85 (1747). Reported also, but not fully, in 2 Ames's Bills
and Notes, 527. The italics are those of the reporter.
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was set out in the count. To this the counsel for plaintift
replied: "The principal matter in this case, and upon which
the whole must turn, is whether here is not a good consider-
ation for the promise laid in this count; and I agree, if there
is not, the plaintiff cannot have judgment" Lee, C. J., having
expressed his view in the following terms: "The count says
that the defendant accepted the bill, and became liable by the
custom, and being so liable, neglected payment, and thereby
the plaintiff was obliged to pay it, and did pay it; by reason
of which premises and the custom, the defendant became
liable, and so promised to pay the plaintiff This seems to me,
as at present advised, to be a good consideration to raise the
promise;" defendant's counsel said, "If this matter be taken in
the manner your lordship seems to say it must, it must be upon
contract, but all actions upon bills are founded on custom.
Indeed, if the defendant had said to the drawer I have not
money by me at present, so you pay it to the payee, and I will
pay you again; this would have been an express contract, and
a strong consideration being at the defendant's request; but
what I rely upon is that the count and promise laid therein are
founded upon custom and not contract, and there being no such
custom among merchants, it is bad." But "the whole court
seemed to be of opinion for the plaintiff; and, after time taken
to consider, overruled all the exceptions taken by the defend-
ants. They said the acceptor had made himself liable to the
drawer, as well as to the payee, and to every indorsee to whom
the payee should transfer the bill."
That the liability of the acceptor to the drawer is upon
contract requiring a consideration, as stated by plaintiff's
counsel and held by the court, and is not " ex quasi contractit "
as argued by defendants' counsel in the foregoing case, is now
well settled. In Cowk, v. DuMnop, 7 D. & E. 565, 572 (798),
Lawrene, J., said: " In short the question comes to this,
whether the drawer of a bill of exchange, who is obliged to
take it up after having negotiated it, is not confined to his
action on the bill to recover against the acceptor. And it
seems to me that he is, for I see no reason to raise an implied
assumpsit as for money paid by the drawer for the acceptor
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when the contract arising out of the bill and the custom was
fully sufficient to enable him to recover what he may be
obliged to pay on the acceptor's refusal."
Likewise the liability of the drawer to the payee, as well as
that of the indorser to the indorsee, rests upon a true contract;
it is not an obligation imposed by law.
In Starke v. Clzeesemnan,' it was argued for the plaintiff (the
payee of a bill who sued the drawer, upon refusal of accept-
ance by the drawee,) that "the custom raises a promise in
law, that the drawer will pay the money if the person upon
whom it is drawn refuses to pay it." But, according to Lord
Raymond's report, " Holt, Ch. J., said that the notion of
promises in law was a metaphysical notion, for the law makes
no promise but when there is a promise of the party. After-"
wards, in this term, judgment was given for the plaintiff
because the drawing of the bill was an actual promise."
According to Salkeld's report," Holt, Ch. J., held the drawing
of the bill was an actual promise; and judgment was given
P " quer." "
The nature of an indorser's liability to an indorsee is stated
by the counsel for plaintiff in Hodgesv. ViclZlas, 2 Shower, 493,
497 (1687), as follows: "Now the law doth suppose (and that's
the supposition which first grounded this sort of contract or
engagement in the civil law and amongst merchants here) that
if at the time of the making this indorsement my client should
have asked the defendant, ' but what if this bill be not paid?'
He would have answered, 'The drawer is a good man': ' But
what if the drawer should fail ?' He would have answered,
, Then I will pay you.' All this is as strongly implied as if
it had been written in express words."
Another case, which is much older than Rann v. Huighes
and a valuable authority upon the topic of this paper, is Brown
v. Marsh, Gilb. 154 (1722). The report of the case and the
editor's note are as follows :
"This was a motion for an injunction, and the case was: A
note was given by the defendant as trustee for the executrix
of Fowler for some shares in the Assiento Brass and Copper
I Lord Ray. 538 (1700), s. c. Salk. 128.
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Mines to the plaintiff Brown, who was an original undertaker
in setting on foot that bubble. And here it was very much
disputed whether the plaintiff should be left to law upon this
note; for that these mines were a mere bubble and had no
existence in rerurn natura; and Fowler was an innocent
person that only sold the shares he had bought, and the
plaintiff was an original undertaker of the project. In this
case it was very much disputed whether the defendant could
give anything in evidence to show that the note wanted a
consideration. The court was equally divided, and two judges
were of opinion that, upon promissory notes, the want of a
consideration could not be given in evidence, for the words of
the Statute of 3 & 4 Anne Cap. 9, touching promissory notes
are, 'That all notes in writing, &c., &c., &c., shall be taken
and construed to be by virtue thereof due and payable to any
such person or persons, bodies politick or corporate, to whom
the same is payable.' The two puisne judges were, therefore,
of opinion that since the statute made it payable by virtue of
the note, then the consideration of the note was not enquirable,
no more than the consideration of a bond; and on a bond the
defendant can only plead non est factum in a court of law;
and if it were sealed and delivered, which were the only
solemnities of contracting appointed by the law, nothing could
be given in evidence touching the consideration. The other
two judges thought there was a great difference between a
note and a bond notwithstanding the statute; for in the case
of a bond where there were solemnities of contracting, viz.,
the sealing and delivery if there was no consideration, yet if
there was no fraud in obtaining the bond, the money was a
gift in law to the obligee; but the note was no more than a
simple contract, and notwithstanding the statute says that the
money shall be due and payable by virtue of the note, that
only makes the note itself evidence of the consideration, which
it was not before the statute, as appears by the cases of Clark
v. Martin and Potter v. Pearson, I Salk. 129. But though
the note itself be evidence of consideration, yet it is not con-
clusive evidence but turns the proof upon the defendant to
show that there was no consideration given for such a note;
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and so he can show that it was still but a simple contract, and
therefore but nudum pactum unde non mitur actio, and of this
opinion was my Lord Chancellor King who moved to rule it
so at Nisi Prius.
But in this case an injunction was granted on terms, the
defendant agreeing to give judgment with a release of errors
subject to order on hearing.
Ndte. This matter was very much disputed in the Hall, and
this case was put: That if A forged a bank note, and gave it
as a consideration to B for B's note, or if A should have given
brass money for his note, could not this want of consideration
be given in evidence ? If not, A might recover against B
when there was no debt; and certainly the statute did not
design that a man should recover when there was no debt at-
all; for the statute only makes promissory notes as bills of
exchange; and though the acceptor and indorser were bound
to pay those bills, whether they had received any consideration
or not, because the acceptor accepts it for the honor of the
drawer and the indorser negotiates it; yet the drawer of the
bill was not obliged to pay it to the person in whose behalf
the bill was drawn unless he had paid him a consideration;
but the owning a value received was evidence primafacie that
a consideration was paid to the drawer of the bill: Vid. I Salk.
125; 4 Mod. 242, 244."
It will be observed that the two judges, who were of the
opinion that a want of consideration was not a legal defer e to
a promissory note, based that opinion on the language of the
then recent Statute of Anne, and did not intimate that such a
defense could not be interposed in an action on a bill of ex-
change; while the view of the other two judges and of the
Lord Chancellor was that the statute, which declared that
"such notes shall have the same effect as inland bills of
exchange," and that the holders thereof "may maintain an
action for the same in such manner as he, she or they might
do upon any inland bill of exchange, made or drawn accord-
ing to the custom of merchants," made the note evidence of
consideration, yet not conclusive evidence, but only turned
the proof upon the defendant to show that there was no con-
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sideration given therefor. Moreover, the language of the
reporter leaves no room for doubt that a bill of exchange was
regarded by the bench and bar at that time as primafacie
evidence only of a consideration, which could be overcome as
against immediate parties and those not having the rights of
bonafide holders for value, by proof of a want of consideration.
The view, expressed by this reporter, of the rule of law then
prevailing, is entitled to the highest consideration. He was
Chief Baron of the Irish Court of Exchequer from July 5,
1715, to May 18, 1722, a member of theEnglish Exchequer
Chamber from May 24, 1722, until his death in October,
1725, and Chief Baron from June 3, 1725. His view is in
accordance with the statements of Ashurst, J., of Bayley, of Kyd,
and of modern authorities and, it is submitted, fully warrants
the proposition that, as between the immediate parties to a bill
or note, a consideration is and has always been necessary in
English law to the validity of the obligation.
It may be said that the question raised in Brown v. i4arsh,
was whether a failure of consideration, not a want of consider-
ation, is a defense to 'a note. Several replies can be made to
such an observation. First, a failure of consideration was not
a legal defense to a bond, any more than a want of consider-
ation was a defense. Second, the judges and the learned
reporter did not intimate that there was any distinction between
the availability of the two defenses. Third, ample judicial
authority exists for the proposition that there is no such
distinction.'
Undoubtedly a bill or note differs from most written
contracts, not under seal, in importing a consideration for the
promise therein contained-it being treated by the courts as
affording prima face evidence of a consideration. The reason
for this judicial presumption has been pointed out repeatedly.
I Le Blanc v. Sangler, 12 Mart. (La.) 402, (1822). "There is no
difference between a want and a failure of consideration. Each may be
set up as a defense, not only against the original payee, but also against
an indorsee" who is not a bona fide holder for value. Hill v. Buck-
minster, 5 Pick. 391, supra; Ridout v. Bristow, I C. & J., 231 (i83o);
Bayley, B., "You may prove failure, or want, or illegality of considera-
tion."
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"A bill of exchange in its origin was an instrument by which
a trade debt due in one place was transferred in another. It
merely avoided the necessity of transmitting cash from place
to place.' "Bills of exchange can only be used for one given
purpose, namely, to extend credit by a speedy transfer of the
debt, which one person owes another, to a third person. Bills
of lading may be assigned for as many different purposes as
goods may be delivered."' "In their nature they (bills of
lading and bills of exchange) are different. A bill of
exchange always imports to be for value received; but the
very reverse is the case with the bill of lading. For in few, if
any instances, is the consignor paid for the goods till delivery;
and bills of exchange were first invented for the purpose of
remitting money from one- country to another, which is not-
the case with bills of lading." 3  In short, courts took judicial
notice of the customs of merchants in accordance with which
bills of exchange were employed as instruments for the trans-
mission of trade debts.' When such an instrument was made
the basis of an action, the" courts presumed that it represented,
as almost every bill at the time actually did represent, a trade
transaction, and placed on the defendant the burden of show-
ing that the bill in suit was exceptional in its character, in
having been issued without a consideration.
It is not surprising that the want of consideration as a
defense to bills and notes was rarely interposed until the
present century. So long as merchants used them almost
wholly for the'single purpose of transferring trade debts, the
question of consideration could rarely arise. As soon, how-
ever, as the currency theory of negotiable paper became
prominent, and bills and notes ceased to be veritable repre-
sentatives of trade transactions, and were employed more and
more as instruments of credit, the want of consideration was
I Chalmer's Bills of Exchange, Introduction (4 th Ed.) LIV.
2 Loughborough, L., in Lickbarrow v. Mason, I H. Bl. 357, 361 (1790).
1 Shepherd, in support of demurrer, Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 D. & R. 63,
67 (1787),
4See the Declarations in Peter Vanheath v. Turner, Winch, 24 (1622),
and Martin v. Bouse, 2 Croke Jac. 6 (i6o3), where the custom of mer-
chants, as set out, includes the payment of money for the bill.
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often set up as a defense to such instruments, with the result
that, both in England and in this country, they were judicially
recognized as forming no real exception to the rule that a con-
sideration is necessary to the validity of every simple contract.
The soundness of this generally accepted doctrine has been
attacked by counsel, frequently, of late. Whether or not
these assaults are due to the positive statements and per-
suasive arguments which have emanated from distinguished
teachers of the law in recent years, the writer does not know.
This is certain, however, that a large'body of judicial decisions
has been evoked by these attacks within the last decade, and
that they uniformly support the doctrine that a bill or note is
not a specialty but a simple written contract, to the validity of
which a consideration is necessary.1
A careful comparison of these decisions, with Chief Baron
Gilbert's report of Brown v. Marsh, will show that the rule of
law, stated by him nearly two hundred years ago, is the rule
of law to-day on this topic. It will show, t6o, that the dictum
of Lord Mansfield in Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1664
(1765), that "in commercial cases amongst merchants the
want of consideration is not an objection," has been properly
characterized as "a solitary dictum barren of results ; "....that
I A few of the recent cases in which the decisions have been based on
this doctrine are the following: McCollum v. Edmunds, io9 Ala. 322,
19 So. 5o (i896) ; Leverone v. Hildreth, 8o Cal. 139, 22 Pac. 72 (1889) ;
Tracy v. Alvord, i18 Cal. 654, 50 Pac. 757 (1897) ; Shaw v. Camp, i6o Ill.
425, 43 N. B. 6o8 (1896): First Nat. Bank v. Felt, ioo Ia. 68o, 69 N. W.
1057 (1897) ; Marsh v. Chown, 73 N. W (Ia.) IO46 (z898) ; Dunkham v.
Morse, 158 Mass. 132 (1893); Germania Bank v. Michand, 62 Minn. 459,
65 N. W. 70 (1895); Trevoli v. Sargent, 63 Minn. 211, 65 N. W. 349
(1895) ; Holmes v. Roper, 141 N. Y. 64, 36 N. R. i8o (1894) ; In re Kern's
Estate, 171 Pa. 55, 33 At. 129 (1895) ; Redding v. Redding's Estate, 69
Vt. 500, 38 At. 230 (1897) ; Price Co. Bank v. McKenzie, 91 Wis. 658, 65
N. W. 507 (1895).
The same doctrine has been recognized in numerous cases, of which the
following are some of the most recent: Pauly v. Murray, nio Cal. 13, 42
Pac. 313 (1895) ; Pauly v. O'Brien, 69 Fed. 460 (i895); Israel v. Gale,
77 Fed. 532 (1896) ; Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, go Me. 468, 38 At. 374
(x897) ; Higgins v. Ridgway, T53 N. Y. 130, 47 N. E. 32 (1897) ; Johnson
v. Rodger, ii9 N. C. 446, 25 S. B. 1021 (1896); Fink v. Farmer's Bank,
178 Pa. 154, 35 At. 636. Compare the last case with Meredith v. Chute,
1d. Ray. 759, cited by Blackstone, and stated above.
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it,- anomalous character was rightly seen at the time and it has
never been followed;" that it came too late by a century or
two to have any practical influence upon English law.1
If a judge of Lord Mansfield's commanding authority could
not win acceptance for the anomalous doctrine that the contract
of a party to negotiable paper i binding without a considera-
tion, any attempt at this day to rehabilitate the doctrine must
be doomed to failure. However ingenious and learned may
be the arguments of counsel who make the attempt, these
efforts will be apt.to elicit from the courts only such responses
as that of Mr. Justice Mitchell: "The necessity of a considera-
tion having been settled more than four hundred years ago, is
scarcely open to discussion now." 2
Francis M. Burdiek.
Columbia University,
School of Law.
I Pollock's Principles of Contracts (Wald's new edition), 169.
2 In re Kern's Estate, 171 Pa. 55 (1895).
